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We propose and experimentally demonstrate a new scheme for measuring high-dimensional phase
states using a two-photon interference technique, which we refer to as quantum-controlled mea-
surement. Using this scheme, we implement a d-dimensional time-phase quantum key distribution
(QKD) system and achieve secret key rates of 5.26 and 8.65 Mbps using d = 2 and d = 8 quantum
states, respectively, for a 4 dB channel loss, illustrating that high-dimensional time-phase QKD
protocols are advantageous for low-loss quantum channels. This work paves the way for practical
high-dimensional QKD protocols for metropolitan-scale systems. Furthermore, our results apply
equally well for other high-dimensional protocols, such as those using the spatial degree-of-freedom
with orbital angular momentum states being one example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interference of two photons is central to many impor-
tant quantum information technologies, such as linear
optics-based quantum computing [1], quantum metrol-
ogy [2] and sensing [3]. Recently, two-photon interfer-
ence has been used in several quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols [4, 5], which are provably secure tech-
niques that allow two spatially remote users (Alice and
Bob) to share a random secret string in the presence of
an eavesdropper (Eve) [6].
A typical two-photon interference-based QKD scheme,
such as the measurement device-independent QKD pro-
tocol [4], requires Alice and Bob to transmit quantum
states to a third party (Charlie), who interferes the pho-
tons at a beamsplitter, records the time-of-arrival using
single-photon counting detectors and announces the de-
tection statistics [7]. If the two photons are indistin-
guishable, they always leave the beamsplitter from the
same output port (ideal case), resulting in no coincidence
events in the output detectors. This effect, which arises
from the destructive interference of the photons’ proba-
bility amplitudes, is known as the two-photon Hong-Ou-
Mandel (HOM) interference [8]. Observing a coincidence
in the two output detectors indicate that the quantum
states are distinguishable, and therefore can be used to
bound the disturbance caused by an eavesdropper in the
quantum channel.
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Because coincidence counts can be used to deter-
mine the degree of distinguishability, a two-photon
interference-based measurement scheme can also be used
in a prepare-and-measure scenario in which the measure-
ment is performed by the receiver (Bob). Recently, in-
terference schemes have been used in qubit-based (di-
mension d = 2) QKD protocols, such as the round-robin
scheme [5]. Generally, a two-photon interference-based
scheme in a qubit-based protocol is more complicated
than a direct measurement scheme where an incoming
photon is measured using a receiver comprising of lin-
ear optics and single-photon detectors. A two-photon
interference scheme requires a second source of quan-
tum states, single-photon detectors, coincidence coun-
ters, etc., making it more complicated than a direct mea-
surement scheme. Unless the QKD scheme provides some
additional advantages, such as more stringent security,
higher secret key rate, or longer distance communication,
a direct measurement scheme is generally preferred.
Yet, there are several QKD protocols, such as the
round-robin [9], high-dimensional [10], and Chau-15 [11],
where a two-photon interference measurement scheme
is potentially easier to implement than the complicated
interferometric measurement scheme that is most com-
monly used. Furthermore, a two-photon measurement
scheme provides a means to scale the encoding dimen-
sion beyond small d at the cost of essentially no addi-
tional changes to the experimental setup. It is possible
to change the dimension of the encoding states using soft-
ware changes without changing anything in the hardware
platform.
Here, we consider a two-photon interference-based
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2measurement, which we refer to as quantum-controlled
measurement scheme, as a means to detect d-dimensional
phase states in a time-bin high-dimensional QKD proto-
col [10]. We call this a quantum-controlled scheme be-
cause the measurement process is mediated by the con-
trolled (ancilla) photonic state from Bob’s local oscilla-
tor, analogous to a control bit in a quantum register cir-
cuit [12]. In a time-phase QKD protocol, the time-bin
states, denoted as |tm〉, m ∈ {0, .., d − 1} are used to
encode information and the corresponding phase states
|fn〉 = 1/
√
d
d−1∑
m=0
e2piinm/d|tm〉, n = 0, ..., d − 1 are used
to monitor the presence of an eavesdropper. Each quan-
tum state — time or phase — occupies d temporal bins
each of width τ (typically ∼ 100−1, 000 ps) and encodes
log2 d bits of information per photon.
When the dimension of the system is small, the rate of
state preparation 1/(τd) is much higher than the max-
imum rate at which most single-photon counting detec-
tors can operate, which is mainly limited by the long
detector recovery time τD (∼ 10 − 100 ns) [13]. During
this window, a single-photon detector can only detect
one incoming photon, thereby limiting the rate of pho-
ton detection, an effect known as detector saturation.
High-dimensional time-phase encoding (d > 2) alleviates
this problem by encoding more than one bit of informa-
tion per photon. By tuning the dimension of the en-
coding states and matching the expected rate of photon
detection ∼ η/(τd) to 1/τD, where η is the global system
loss, it is possible to maximize the bits of information
per received photon and hence the secret key rate. Us-
ing this technique, many research groups [14, 15] have
achieved high-secret key rates, demonstrating the feasi-
bility of high-dimensional QKD, thereby overcoming the
detector saturation problem.
One challenging aspect of this protocol is that gen-
erating the phase states requires substantial experimen-
tal resources. When d is small, the phase states can
be generated using a few arbitrary pattern generators,
digital-to-analog converters and phase modulators. As d
increases beyond small d’s, generating the phase states
become more expensive and challenging. To solve this
problem, we recently studied the feasibility of using only
a subset of the d phase states, and demonstrated that
the protocol can be secured with just one phase state,
although at the cost of lower error tolerance [16]. An
implication of this result is that the dimension of the en-
coding states can be changed using only software. As an
example, consider a time-phase QKD system where Eve’s
presence is monitored by transmitting and measuring the
state |f0〉, which does not require phase modulation on
individual time bins (see above). Then, the the dimen-
sion of the QKD system can be changed by redefining the
the time and phase states at the software level prior to
the communication, without any changes to the physical
transmitter set-up.
Another challenging aspect of this protocol is that
measuring the phase states requires complicated mea-
surement schemes, such as a combination of electro-optic
modulators and fiber Bragg gratings [17], or a tree of
time-delay interferometers (DI) [15]. Our past work has
primarily focused on using a tree of time-delay interfer-
ometers to measure the phase states [15]. Some draw-
backs of the interferometric scheme are that the num-
ber of time-delay interferometers required to detect a d-
dimensional phase state scales as 2d−1, and the efficiency
of the state detection decreases as 1/d [15]. As a result,
the protocol is difficult to scale beyond small d.
To establish a truly arbitrary dimensional QKD, here
we propose and implement a quantum-controlled mea-
surement scheme based on two-photon interference that
can be used to detect a phase state of any dimension.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II,
we discuss qualitatively the equivalence of a two-photon
interference with the interferometers-based measurement
scheme. In Sec. III, we discuss the security analysis of
the protocol that we use to analyze the data in a proof-of-
principle demonstration of the protocol (Sec. IV). Finally,
we conclude the paper in Sec. V with a perspective on
future improvements.
II. QUANTUM CONTROLLED
MEASUREMENT SCHEME
In d-dimensional time-phase QKD, the time and phase
states are prepared with biased probabilities pT and
pF := 1− pT, respectively. When the quantum states ar-
rive in Bob’s receiver, a beamsplitter is used to randomly
direct the incoming states for temporal or phase basis
measurement. The time-basis states are detected using
a single-photon detector connected to a high-resolution
time-to-digital converter, and the phase states are mea-
sured either using a tree of time delay interferometers
or the quantum controlled scheme as we described below
and illustrated in Fig. 1.
Consider the d-dimensional phase state |f0〉 =
1/
√
d
∑d−1
i=0 |ti〉, which is used as a monitoring basis state
in an asymmetric time-phase QKD protocol. Experi-
mentally, the state |f0〉 can be generated by modulating
a continuous-wave laser into a wavepacket consisting of
narrow-width peaks in d contiguous temporal bins. The
overall phase of the wavepacket, denoted as φ, is random-
ized between each transmission attempt by Alice, but the
local phase between the peaks remains coherent with a
phase difference taken to be zero. To measure a d = 4
phase state, the tree-like arrangement consists of three
time-delay interferometers (DIs) with the optical path-
length differences and the phases of the interferometers
set so that there is a one-to-one mapping between the
input phase state |fn〉 and the detector Dn in which the
event is registered [18], as shown in Fig. 1(a).
A qualitative analysis of the interference pattern ob-
served in the output detectors reveals that the effective
function of the interferometric tree is to delay each suc-
cessive peak, and interfere them all in the same time-bin,
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FIG. 1. Illustration of different phase-state measure-
ment schemes. A phase measurement scheme consisting
of (a) tree of time-delay interferometers and (b) free-running
indistinguishable sources.
resulting in a constructive interference in time bin 3 at
the output detector D0 (right panel of Fig. 1(a)). When
the incoming state is the ideal |f0〉 state, no event is
recorded in the central time bins of detectors D1-D3 due
to the destructive interference of the wavepacket peaks.
Any disturbance of the incoming state results in incom-
plete destructive interference, leading to events appear-
ing in time bin 3 in detectors D1-D3, and hence can be
used to identify eavesdropping. The probability ampli-
tudes observed in all other time bins in all the detectors
result from the interference of a subset of the wavepacket
peaks and do not provide complete information about
the incoming quantum state. See Ref. [18] for a detailed
description of how the interferometric setup detects the
phase states.
An equivalent scheme to detect the phase state is to in-
terfere the incoming state from Alice with a locally gener-
ated state in the receiver. Bob’s source can have an arbi-
trary phase δ with respect to φ, as long as his source gen-
erates quantum states that matches Alice’s in the spatial,
spectral, polarization and temporal domains. When the
phase of Bob’s quantum state is arbitrary with respect
to Alice’s, the resulting interference pattern shows the
HOM effect. Thus, disruption of the HOM two-photon
interference can be also be used to detect any pertur-
bation of the incoming state from Alice as illustrated in
Fig. 1(b).
To see how HOM interference can be used to determine
perturbation of Alice’s states in the quantum channel,
we consider the simple case where the incoming state
from Alice is a pure single-photon state, has local phase
perturbations and is input through the beamsplitter port
a. The incoming state can be represented as
|f0〉A = 1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
eiφeiλi |ti〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
eiφeiλia†i |vac〉, (1)
where eiλi is a complex number of unit magnitude, the
operator a†i denotes the field creation operator in tempo-
ral mode i, and |vac〉 represents the vacuum. We assume
that Bob’s locally generated state is ideal, is coupled into
the beamsplitter through the input port b, and is de-
scribed by
|f0〉B = 1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ti〉 =
d−1∑
i=0
b†i |vac〉. (2)
A beamsplitter transforms the creation operator a†i (b
†
i )
as 1/
√
2(c†i + d
†
i ) [1/
√
2(c†i − d†i )]. Therefore, the overall
transformation of the input states |f0〉A|f0〉B through the
beamsplitter can be written as
|f0〉A|f0〉B → 1
2d
d−1∑
i,j=0
eiφeiλi(c†i + d
†
i )(c
†
j − d†j)|vac〉 (3)
=
1
2d
{ d−1∑
i=j=0
eiλi(c†i c
†
i − d†id†i )+
d−1∑
i6=j=0
[(eiλi + eiλj )(c†i c
†
j − d†id†j)+
(eiλi − eiλj )(c†jd†i − d†jc†i )]
}
|vac〉. (4)
An important property of the output state in Eq. 3
is that the probability of observing a coincidence in the
two output detectors (|eiλi − eiλj |2) goes to zero when
the incoming state is ideal (λi = λj = 1). Any phase
perturbation that results due to an eavesdropper trying
to estimate the incoming quantum states manifests itself
in the form of coincidence with probability |eiλi − eiλj |2,
which can be detected in the experiment as quantum bit
errors in the phase basis. This is similar to the interfer-
ometric scheme where the perturbations result in events
in the central time bins in output detectors D1-D3, as
opposed to no expected events due to destructive inter-
ference in the absence of a phase perturbation.
This simple example gives an intuitive explanation of
how the quantum-controlled scheme can be used to mon-
itor the presence of an eavesdropper. Below we extend
this to the case where Alice transmits phase-randomized
weak coherent states and Eve can attack the quantum
states using collective attack strategies.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of this protocol is based on the semi-
definite programming (SDP)-based proof we presented
in Ref. [16]. Here, for completeness, we briefly summa-
rize the security analysis, starting with the case where
Alice sends pure single-photon states and later extend it
for the more practical case of weak coherent states with
4three-level decoy wavepackets. Using the decoy states,
we place bounds on the single-photon detection rates in
the time and phase basis. We also show a new approach
to bound the single-photon error rates in the phase basis,
inspired from the two-photon interference technique de-
rived in Ref. [19]. The novelty of this technique is that it
allows us to bound the two-photon error rate in the phase
basis |λi − λj |2 using only two decoy states, and single-
click statistics from the two single-photon detectors. We
have modified the approach in Ref. [19] to account for
the arbitrary photon number distribution that Eve can
inject into the receiver. Our approach can also be used
in other two-photon-based interference schemes such as
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [7].
For the security analyses presented below, we assume
that Alice transmits an infinitely long bit string (block
size N → ∞), ignoring the finite-key effects for now,
which are known to be significant if the block size is
shorter than ∼ 106 bits [20]. Later, we provide some
insights on how to consider the finite-key length, which
we will address in a future work.
A. Semi-definite Programming
We assume that Alice transmits single-photon states
of arbitrary dimension in both the time and phase ba-
sis. In the time basis, Alice transmits d temporal states
{t1, ..., td−1}, and in the phase basis she only transmits
the state {f0}. A common technique to analyze the se-
curity of a prepare-and-measure protocol is to represent
the states in an equivalent entanglement-based picture,
assume Eve interacts with each quantum states collec-
tively, and then promote the analysis to general attacks
using known techniques such as de Finetti theorem [21–
24].
In the equivalent entanglement-based picture, Al-
ice and Bob share an entangled state of the form
|φX〉 = 1/
√
d
∑d−1
i=0 |xi〉A|xi〉B where x ∈ {t, f} and
X ∈ {T,F}. The density matrix of the entangled state
can be represented as ρA,B = |φX〉〈φX|. Eve’s collective
interaction with the entangled state transforms the state
into |ΨX〉A,B,E =
∑
i
√
γi|φX〉|γi〉E , where we assume her
interaction with the state is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d). Bob’s measurement operators for each
basis state is defined as ΠXi = |xi〉〈xi|. For the detection
events that he classifies as error bits, the operators are
defined as EX corresponding to quantum bit error rates
eX [16].
The main goal of the security proof is to bound the
hypothetical error rate (the so-called phase error rate eUF )
when the entangled state is in the phase basis, but both
Alice and Bob perform measurements using the time-
basis operator. This hypothetical error rate is different
from the quantum bit error rates in the time eT and the
phase basis eF as described above in that the former is
quantified as a bound and the latter are determined from
the experiment. Throughout the rest of the paper, we
distinguish these by referring to them as the phase error
rate and the quantum bit error rates in the time and
phase basis.
The SDP-based security analysis allows us to quantify
eUF under the assumption that the quantum bit error rates
for each basis are known a priori. Formally, the problem
becomes
maximize Tr [EFρAB ] = e
U
F (5)
s.t.Tr [ρAB ] = 1, ρAB ≥ 1, (6)
Tr [ETρAB ] = eT, (7)
Tr [Πxi ⊗Πyj ] = pi,j (8)
∀{x, y} ∈ {T,F} & i, j = 0, ..., d− 1. (9)
Here, we make two assumptions regarding Bob’s phase
state measurement device. First, we assume that Bob’s
device is ideal which can be adapted to the practical,
non-ideal case by changing the values of pi,j . Specifically,
by preparing and measuring states in both the time- and
phase-basis, the values of pi,j ’s can be set to the probabil-
ities estimated from the experiment. Second, we assume
that Bob’s phase measurement scheme is well calibrated.
In the context of this protocol, this means that the Bob
generates phase states |f0〉 with well-defined phase values
on each wavepacket peak. This is a valid assumption in a
prepare-and-measure scheme because Eve does not have
access to Bob’s measurement devices.
An interesting feature of our security analysis is that it
is highly flexible and allows us to change the dimension,
number of monitoring states, and probability with which
Alice wants to transmit these states easily through a sim-
ple program. We use the CVX [25] library in Matlab to
optimize the value of eUF . For additional information re-
garding this approach, we refer readers to Ref. [16]. We
also make this code available for the community through
Ref. [26].
Our security analysis is not only valid for this protocol,
but also for any other two-basis QKD protocol with a di-
rect measurement scheme, e.g., high-dimensional spatial-
modes-based scheme. To use our program for any other
protocol, one has to estimate the values of eT (assuming
symmetric error rates in both the basis, i.e., eT = eF),
and pi,j ’s from experimental calibration. Using these as
a priori known statistics, one can then solve for eUF using
our Matlab program. Additionally, if Alice and Bob only
use a fraction of the states as monitoring states as we do
here by transmitting only |f0〉, it is possible to calculate
eUF by appropriately adjusting the combinations in Eq. 8.
B. Decoy State Formalism
The SDP-based security analysis discussed above is
formulated under the assumption that Alice and Bob
transmit ideal single-photon states. In practice, most
QKD systems are implemented using attenuated coher-
ent laser sources that generate photons based on a Pois-
son distribution. Due to the probabilistic nature of
5the source, the phase randomized weak coherent states
(PRWCS) generated from a coherent laser includes, in
addition to the single-photon states, vacuum and multi-
photon states. A commonly used technique to over-
come this problem is to generate PRWCS with different
mean photon numbers, and use the detection rates of
each mean photon number to quantify the fraction of the
states that contains exactly 1 photon, also known as the
decoy state method [27].
Due to the nature of this protocol, implementing
decoy-state methods for our d-dimensional protocol is
slightly complicated. The main challenge is that the
time-basis states are measured using a direct measure-
ment scheme, while the phase-basis states are measured
using a two-photon interference scheme. For the time-
basis, we can adapt the existing three mean photon
number decoy bounds that are commonly used in most
prepare-and-measure QKD schemes. For the phase-basis,
we identify a technique to bound the single-photon error
rates directly from the click statistics measured in the
experiment [19].
To implement the decoy method, we assume that Alice
transmits quantum states of three different mean photon
numbers µ1, µ2 and µ3 where µ2 + µ3 < µ1 with prob-
abilities pµ1 , pµ2 and pµ3 , respectively. For the phase
measurement scheme, Bob also generates the phase basis
state |f0〉 with mean photon numbers µ1, µ2 and µ3. Un-
der these assumptions, the secret key rate of the system
can be written as [28]
r := RT,1[log2 d−H(eUF )]−∆EC, (10)
where r is the secret key rate, RT,1 is the single-
photon gain in the time-basis (see below), H(x) :=
−x log2(x/d)− (1− x) log2(1− x) and ∆EC := RTH(eT)
represents the number of bits used in the error correction
with RT being the detection rate in the time-basis.
In this protocol, the phase error rate eUF depends on
the quantum bit error rate in the phase basis eF, which
is defined as the fraction of the events that are recorded
as coincidence events in the detectors D0 and D1 when
single-photon states are input from the ports a and b
of the beamsplitter. Estimating eF is somewhat compli-
cated because here both Alice and Bob transmit PRWCS,
which means that we have to bound them based on the
detection statistics to estimate the conditional probabil-
ities of receiving single-photon state from each Alice and
Bob. There are three primary steps to bounding eUF ,
which are also provided in the supplementary informa-
tion in detail. Here, we briefly summarize these steps for
completeness.
First, we upper-bound the conditional probability Y U11
that Alice and Bob each transmit a single-photon state
and both detectors D0 and D1 record a detection, re-
sulting in a coincidence event. These can be estimated
from the coincidence probabilities Cµi,µj where only four
combinations of µi and µj are necessary (see Supplemen-
tary Information). We calculate the upper-bound of the
conditional coincidence probability as
Y U11 ≤
1
µiµj
[
Cµi,µjeµi+µj − (Cµi,0eµi + C0,µjeµj ) + Y00
]
,
(11)
where Y00 represents the conditional probability of ob-
serving a coincidence when both Alice and Bob transmit
vacuum states.
Second, we estimate the lower-bound conditional prob-
ability Y LFA,1 (Y
L
FB,1
) of Alice (Bob) transmitting a state
with a single photon and either of the detectors D0 or
D1 recording a detection event. These can be estimated
using the events where Alice (Bob) transmits state |f0〉
and Bob (Alice) transmits a vacuum (see Supplementary
Information). These detection rates allow us to lower
bound the fraction of input states to the beamsplitters
that contains exactly one photon at each input port a
and b. Using these lower bounds, we can calculate the
quantum bit error in the phase basis as
eF ≤ Y
U
11
Y LFA,1Y
L
FB,1
. (12)
Finally, we use the SDP program and the value of eF to
calculate the eUF . Based on the results from Ref. [16], we
note that eF = e
U
F if Alice and Bob transmit all d or d−1
phase states as is required for a complete protocol. Since
only the state |f0〉 is transmitted as the monitoring basis
state in this protocol, we use eF as the a priori error rate
in the SDP program to estimate eUF .
In the time-basis, the single-photon gain, defined as the
joint probability that Alice transmits a time-basis state
and Bob receives a detection click, is bounded by
RT,1 = [pµ1(µ1e
µ1) + pµ2(µ2e
µ2) + pµ3(µ3e
µ3)]YT,1.
(13)
In Eq. 13, YT,1 represents the conditional probability that
Bob’s detector records an event given Alice transmits a
single-photon state [29]
Y LT,1 ≥
µ1
µ1µ2 − µ1µ3 − µ22 + µ23
×[
RT,µ2e
µ2 −RT,µ3eµ3 −
µ22 − µ23
µ21
(RT,µ1e
µ1 − YT,0)
]
,
(14)
where RT,µi i ∈ {1, 2, 3} represents the joint probability
of Alice transmitting a state with mean photon number
µi and Bob receiving a detection event, and the term YT,0
is the zero-photon yield defined as
YT,0 := Y
L
T,0 ≥
µ2RT,µ3e
µ3 − µ3RT,µ2eµ2
µ2 − µ3 . (15)
With all terms defined, we can now derive the phase-
error-rate bound and simulate the secret key rate as de-
fined in Eq. 10. To derive the upper bound eUF , we use
eF as the quantum bit error rate in the phase basis and
6use the SDP approach to calculate eUF . This bound is
generally worse in the case where Alice transmits just
one state in the phase-basis than the case where Alice
and Bob transmit all d or d − 1 phase states [16]. De-
spite the worse bound, transmitting just one phase state
is much simpler to implement experimentally and easier
to scale. If the HOM interference visibility between Alice
and Bob’s source is high, the difference between sending
one or d states is small, which can lead to high secret key
rate in an experiment as we showed below.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
Our proof-of-principle experimental setup is shown in
Fig. 2. Alice’s transmitter consists of two electro-optic in-
tensity modulators driven with a field programmable gate
array (FPGA) to create the time and phase states at a
rate of 2500/d MHz. The first intensity modulator (IM1)
is used to generate the temporal states {t0, t1, ..., td−1}
and the phase state {f0} with an optical pulse width of
∼80 ps in a single temporal bin of width 400 ps. The
second intensity modulator (IM2) is used to normalize
the amplitude level of the phase state {f0} and to create
the signal, decoy and vacuum states with mean photon
numbers µ1, µ2 and µ3, respectively. A variable opti-
cal attenuator (VOA) is used to reduce the mean photon
number, and a second one is used to simulate the quan-
tum channel loss.
A section of Bob’s receiver has an identical layout as
Alice’s setup in which the intensity modulators (IM3 and
IM4) are used to generate the phase state |f0〉 with the
same mean photon numbers as Alice. Bob’s quantum
states are then attenuated to match the detection rate
of the incoming quantum states from Alice. The time-
basis measurement is performed using a superconduct-
ing nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD, Quantum
Opus) with a nominal detection efficiency of 80%, tim-
ing jitter of 50 ps, dark count rates of < 100 cps and
a deadtime of ∼ 30 ns. For the phase-basis quantum-
controlled measurement, both Alice and Bob’s states are
passed through two fiber-based polarizing beamsplitters
(PBSs) before interfering at a 50/50 polarization main-
taining fiber beamsplitter (2×2). Although we place the
first PBS after the BS, to ensure that Eve cannot take
any advantage of the polarization mismatch between the
two bases, it could also be placed before the BS without
affecting the system operation. The two output ports of
the beamsplitter are coupled into two nominally identical
SNSPDs. The detector signals are time-tagged using a
time-to-digital converter (Agilent Acqiris U1051A) and
streamed to a computer for further post-processing.
The indistinguishability of Alice and Bob’s quantum
states in the spectral domain is ensured by mixing a frac-
tion of the power from each output beam of their lasers
and generating a beatnote frequency, which is detected
using a high-speed photoreceiver (Miteq DR-125G-A, not
shown in Fig. 2). Assuming the laser center frequen-
cies are within ∆ν of each other, the phase between the
two lasers increases by 2pi∆νt as a function of time t.
Alice’s laser (Wavelength Reference Clarity NLL-1550-
HP) is locked to a hydrogen cyanide molecular absorp-
tion line and Bob’s laser (Agilent HP81682A) is tunable
within a resolution of 0.1 pm. This allows us to tune
the beatnote frequency between the two lasers well be-
low 10 MHz, which is equal to a phase shift of 0.05 rad
for d = 2 states. Throughout the experimental runs,
the beatnote is monitored periodically and tuned as re-
quired. In this work, we do not actively phase randomize
Alice and Bob’s quantum states; instead, we take ad-
vantage of the slight mismatch between the two lasers’
center frequencies to randomize the phase. In the future,
two high-speed phase modulators, independently driven
by two FPGAs can be used to randomly modulate the
phase of each state [30].
To test the indistinguishability of Alice and Bob’s op-
tical wavepackets, we characterize the HOM interference
between the two sources based on the second-order coher-
ence function g(2)(τ) as a function of the relative time-
delay τ between the wavepackets. For the characteriza-
tion measurement, the intensity modulators are driven
with a periodic pattern from the FPGA, which generates
single-peaked optical wavepackets at a repetition rate of
7.81 MHz with a mean-photon number of 0.016± 0.001.
The relative temporal delay between the wavepackets is
tuned using an optical delay line (ODL, General Photon-
ics VDL-001-35-50-SS-FC/APC) over a temporal range
of 340 ps. The coincidence events are recorded for each
temporal delay using a time-to-digital converter. Fig-
ure 3 shows a typical HOM interference signature repre-
sented as g(2)(τ) = Cµ,µ/(S1S2), where S1 and S2 rep-
resent the probability of detecting single events in the
detectors D0 and D1, respectively. When the wavepack-
ets are completely overlapping, the coincidence counts
decreases approximately by a factor of 2, corresponding
to a g(2)(0) = 0.52 ± 0.02, which is consistent with the
theoretical limit of 0.5 (red dahsed line) within the ex-
perimental uncertainties.
For the proof-of-principle QKD demonstration, we set
the temporal delay so that the coincidence rate is mini-
mum (smallest g(2)(τ)), which ensures high interference
visibility defined as V = 1 − g(2)(0). A fixed pattern
of length N = 1012/d is transmitted from Alice using a
pre-determined random basis choice in the FPGA mem-
ory. The total time of communication session is set to
400 s, which is long enough to yield > 108-bit long secret
key. Hence, finite-key effects are negligible in the exper-
iment. The time- and phase-basis states are transmitted
with equal probabilities, and each of the three mean pho-
ton numbers are transmitted with 1/3 probability. For
each channel loss, we tune the dimension of the encoding
states between d = 2 to 16 in powers of 2.
Our main experimental results are shown in Fig. 4,
where we show the extractable secret key rate as a func-
tion of d for two channel losses: 4 dB (Fig. 4(a)) and
8 dB (Fig. 4(b)). The secret key rate is calculated using
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup. A field programmable gate array (FPGA, Altera Stratix V) with 7 independent channels is
used to drive Alice and Bob’s intensity modulators (EOSpace) to generate the time and phase basis states. After the quantum
channel, photons incoming to Bob’s receiver are passed through a fiber beamsplitter that makes a passive basis choice.
FIG. 3. Second-order coherence function The temporal
delay is scanned in steps of 20-ps, and the coincidence counts
are recorded. The visibility V ≡ 1 − g2(0) is determined to
be 0.48 ± 0.02.
Eq. 10, where the values of eT, eF, e
U
F , and ∆EC are de-
termined experimentally. Table I summarizes the exper-
imental parameters, including the mean-photon numbers
and the error rates for each photon number eTµi in the
time-basis.
When we assume that eUF is equal to eF, we obtain
the highest achievable secret key rate for the given error
rate (black squares). This is a theoretical limit of the
maximum secret key rate that can be achieved if all d or
d−1 phase states are transmitted [16]. At a channel loss
of 4 dB (Fig. 4(a)), we observe that this theoretical secret
key rate increases with dimension, peaking at d = 4, and
drops as d is increased beyond d = 4.
An important feature of our SNSPDs is that the detec-
tor efficiency changes as a function of detection rate, and
the nominal efficiency of 80% is only achieved if the detec-
tion rate is <1-2 Mcps [31]. As the dimension increases
beyond d = 4, the overall detection rate in the temporal
basis drops below 1.72 Mcps, which is approximately be-
low the detector saturation regime of our SNSPDs. At
d = 8, detector saturation is no longer a dominating fac-
tor, and going beyond d = 8 to d = 16 decreases the
maximum achievable secret key rate even more.
When we use eF and the SDP program to calculate the
bound eUF , we find that the secret key rates remains the
same (3.35 Mbps) at d = 2 but drops to 2.97 and 2.15
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FIG. 4. Experimental results with pT = 0.50 and pF =
0.50. Experimentally determined secret key rates plotted as
a function of the dimension for a quantum channel loss of (a)
4 dB and (b) 8 dB. The solid lines show the simulated secret
key rates derived using channel model described in Ref. [16,
32]. The dashed lines indicate the secret key rates achieved
with d = 2 states.
Mbps for d = 4 and d = 8, respectively (blue pentagrams
in Fig. 4(a)). We cannot calculate the bound for d = 16
because the dimension of the matrices (d⊗d) goes beyond
the maximum size that our version of Matlab can handle
on our computing platform.
There are two main reasons why the secret key rate
drops rapidly for this case. First, for d = 2, the phase
error rate for transmitting d or d − 1 states is same
(eF = e
U
F ) [33], hence there is no penalty for transmit-
ting just one monitoring basis state in d = 2. But, as the
8dimension increases beyond d = 2, eUF for transmitting
fewer than d − 1 states grows rapidly unless eF is low.
This results in larger overhead to determine the presence
of Eve, resulting in a much lower secret key rate. In
our experiment, the imperfect HOM visibility leads to a
quantum bit error rate in the phase basis (eF) between
∼ 3 − 6%, which results in phase error rates between
0.041 and 0.328 for both the channel losses, as shown in
Table I.
To achieve higher secret key rates, we perform another
set of experiments with pT = 0.90 and pF = 0.10. Ad-
ditionally, we tune the interference visibility by carefully
matching the polarization, temporal and spectral overlap
to achieve eF < 0.030. Figure 5 shows the secret key rates
as a function of dimension for a 4 dB channel loss. The
maximum achievable secret key rate when all d or d− 1
states are transmitted in the phase basis are shown as
black squares, and the secret key rate achieved with just
1 monitoring basis state is shown with blue pentagrams.
As before, when all d or d − 1 states are transmitted,
we observe that the theoretical limit maximizes at d = 8
and rolls off all the way up to d = 32. For the case when
only one state is transmitted, the upper bound on the
phase error rate is higher as expected, but remains be-
low 0.171. Unlike the previous cases, here the secret key
rate increases for both d = 4 and d = 8 (blue pentagrams
in Fig. 5), indicating that it is possible to achieve high
secret-key-rate even when transmitting just one monitor-
ing basis state if the error rate is low enough. For d = 8,
using just one transmitting state, we achieve ∼ 60% of
the secret rate that can be achieved by transmitting all
8 phase states. Additionally, with the d = 8 states, we
can achieve ∼ 164% of the secret key rates achieved with
d = 2.
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FIG. 5. Experimental results with pT = 0.90 and pF =
0.10. Observation of high secret key rate with asymmetric
time-phase transmission probabilities and low quantum bit
error rate in the phase basis at 4 dB channel loss.
An interpretation of our results is that it is possible
to achieve on par or better secret key rates than d = 2
using high-dimensional encoding, a low repetition rate
transmitter, and low-detection-rate single-photon detec-
tors if a QKD system can generate and detect quantum
states with low error rates. Additionally, our results con-
clusively demonstrate that high-dimensional encoding is
efficient (more bits per photon) if the quantum channel
loss is low. An advantage of using this protocol is that
the dimension of the system can be tuned using only a
software without changing anything in the hardware plat-
form. This means that the secret key rate of the QKD
system can be characterized rapidly based on the HOM
visibility, and the dimension that maximizes the secret
key rate can be determined without changing anything
in the hardware setup. Such flexibility of the protocol
is highly desired, especially in practical field implemen-
tations where maximizing secret key rate is the primary
goal. This also allows the protocol to scale beyond d = 2
with no additional specialty measurement device.
V. CONCLUSION
There are a few possible directions for extending this
work in the future. For example, one possibility to imple-
ment the QKD system with just two detectors, without
using the one in the time-basis measurement. Specifi-
cally, if the BS and the detector in the time-basis mea-
surement are removed, and the basis choice is deter-
mined actively by whether or not Bob randomly trans-
mits a phase basis state, is it possible to implement the
protocol with just the two detectors? Such a protocol
will require a theoretical investigation of the squashing
model [34], which is important for schemes using thresh-
old single-photon counting detectors. Another possibility
is to use multi-photon-resolving single-photon detectors
for the phase basis measurement, which are now available
with high-detection efficiency and low timing-jitter [35],
both of which are crucial for this protocol. It is also
of interest to investigate a protocol where an untrusted
third-party (Charlie) performs the measurement in an
arrangement similar to the twin-field QKD protocol [36].
Finally, the infinite-key results that we present here can
be promoted to the finite key results using entropic un-
certainty principles [37].
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9TABLE I. Experimental Parameters. The mean-photon numbers µ1, µ2 and µ3, quantum bit error rates in the time-basis
eT,µ1 , eT,µ2 corresponding to mean-photon numbers µ1 and µ2, respectively, two-photon quantum bit error rate in the phase
basis (eF), and upper bound on the phase error rate e
U
F derived from the SDP analysis are listed as a function of the quantum
channel loss for different dimensions (d) and transmission probabilities pT : pF. The horizontal lines in the last column indicate
the phase error rates that could not be calculated due to the outer product of the Hilbert space (d⊗ d) exceeding the matrix
size that Matlab can handle.
Loss = −10 log(ηch) (dB) pT : pF d µ1 µ2 µ3 eT,µ1 eT,µ2 eF eUF
4 0.90:0.10
2
4
8
16
32
0.583 0.160 0.011
0.010
0.005
0.014
0.016
0.021
0.027
0.029
0.038
0.063
0.098
0.015
0.027
0.021
0.030
0.029
0.015
0.130
0.171
——–
——–
4 0.50:0.50
2
4
8
16
0.156 0.059 0.007
0.013
0.022
0.022
0.018
0.037
0.040
0.045
0.041
0.058
0.042
0.041
0.035
0.058
0.205
0.328
——–
8 0.50:0.50
2
4
8
16
0.195 0.064 0.006
0.017
0.013
0.010
0.018
0.036
0.031
0.022
0.029
0.041
0.037
0.038
0.034
0.041
0.181
0.299
——–
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